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WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? THE 
BATTLE AGAINST PREDATORY SUBPRIME 
LENDING 
When Margaret Newton, a 76 year old stroke victim with difficulty 
speaking, seeing, and concentrating, was approached by a local contractor, 
she was persuaded to purchase siding for $9,990.1 The purchase agreement 
arranged financing for Ms. Newton with United Companies Financial 
Corp., a company that securitized its loans, pooled them and sold them on 
Wall Street.2 When the financing closed, Ms. Newton owed not $9,990 but 
$15,500, which included $3,050 in points and fees, plus settlement 
charges.3 Her monthly payment was over $240.4 Moreover, the siding was 
not properly installed on her house.5 Ms. Newton’s total monthly income 
was only $898, and unsurprisingly, she fell behind on her loan payments, at 
which point United Companies attempted to foreclose.6 She was not alone 
in being targeted for a high priced loan.7 Since the collapse of the housing 
market however,8 “active trading in most mortgage-backed securities and 
other structured credit products has virtually come to a halt.”9 In 
conjunction with the housing collapse and current financial crisis, one 
professor has even argued for an outright ban on subprime loans.10
In the 1990s, “subprime lending was handled mainly by finance 
companies that did not fund their high-risk mortgages with federally 
 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See generally the findings of fact in Newton v. United Cos. Fin. Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 444 
(1998); This case was brought to my attention by Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory 
Lending, Securitization, and the Holder In Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 506 
(2002). 
 2. See generally the findings of fact in Newton, 24 F. Supp. 2d 444. 
 3. Id. at 447. 
 4. Id. 
 5. It had been constructed without installation, and had to be stripped off and re-installed with 
it to be effective.  See id. 
 6. Fortunately for Ms. Newton, she found legal help, sued United Companies, and in 
November 1998, the court rescinded her loan and awarded her $2,000, finding that she had not 
received the proper loan disclosures.  Id.; cf. Mox v. Jordan, 463 N.W. 2d 114 (Mich. App. 1990) 
(family that fell victim to the holder in due course doctrine were forced to pay back a $31,000 loan 
they never received). This case was brought to my attention by Eggert, supra note 1. 
 7. While in the mid 1990s “fewer than five percent of mortgage loan originations were 
subprime, by 2005 the figure had jumped to approximately twenty percent.”  Testimony of Sandra 
F. Braunstein, Dir., Div. of Consumer and Cmty. Affairs—Fed. Reserve Bd., Subprime 
Mortgages, before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit, Comm. on Fin. Serv., U.S. 
House of Representatives, (Mar. 27, 2007). 
 8. See Standard & Poors (S&P), National Trend of Home Price Declines Continued through 
the First Half of 2008 According to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices, tbl. 1 (Aug. 26, 
2008). 
 9. Sam Ali, The Odd Mandate that Ate Wall St. SEC urged to abolish mark-to-market rules, 
THE STAR-LEDGER, Oct. 5, 2008, at 1. 
 10. Alan M. White, The Case for Banning Subprime Mortgages, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1133609#. 
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insured bank deposits.”11 By 2002, this market expanded, “with big banks 
[or hedge funds] now controlling ‘five of the nation’s top ten subprime 
[lenders],’ and several other prominent national banks investing in the 
subprime market either by extending lines of credit to subprime lenders, or 
by purchasing subprime loans.”12 Regulatory changes such as the 
deregulation of the banking industry, the desire for increased profits, “the 
absence of mainstream lenders in low-income neighborhoods, tax breaks 
for interest on second mortgages, and ‘appreciating real estate values’ [all] 
made conditions ripe for many subprime lenders to engage in predatory 
practices.”13 Currently, however, “[s]everal structural and economic factors 
have recently slowed subprime growth and increased delinquencies and 
foreclosures.”14 The rise in short term interest rates, along with the decrease 
in the rate of home price appreciation, are just two factors contributing to 
the rise in delinquencies and foreclosures.15 “As a result of mounting 
defaults and delinquencies, one of the largest subprime lenders, New 
Century Financial Corporation, filed for bankruptcy on April 2, 2007,” and 
the collapse of this industry has led many other lenders to file for 
bankruptcy, while others have “simply exited the subprime market 
altogether.”16
Most of all, predatory subprime lenders have entered this market 
because of significant monetary incentives.
 
17 “The borrowers in this 
[predatory] market are people who, because of historical credit rationing, 
discrimination, and other social and economic forces, are disconnected from 
the credit market.”18
                                                                                                                 
 11. Anne-Marie Motto, Skirting the Law: How Predatory Mortgage Lenders Are Destroying 
the American Dream, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 859 (2002). 
 12. Id. at 859. 
 13. Id. at 859–60. 
 14. Dr. Faten Sabry & Dr. Thomas Schopflocher, The Subprime Meltdown: A Primer, Part I of 
a NERA Insight Series (June 21, 2007) at 2, http://www.nera.com/image/SEC_SubprimeSeries_ 
Part1_ June2007_FINAL.pdf. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. It has been estimated that subprime loan originations increased from $35 billion in 1994 to 
$160 billion in 1999, which has been attributed to refinancings and profitable spreads. See DEP’T 
OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & DEP’T OF THE TREASURY TASK FORCE ON PREDATORY LENDING, 
CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 30, 45 (June 2000) [hereinafter HUD-
TREASURY REPORT], available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf. 
 18. “They have a range of credit ratings and some actually would qualify for prime loans . . . 
while others cannot afford any credit regardless of the terms.” Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. 
McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. 
REV. 1255, 1279 (2002) [hereinafter A Tale of Three Markets]. 
 Brokers and originators continue to exploit borrowers’ 
disconnection to the credit market and make loans with predatory terms. 
High-pressure tactics such as door-to-door solicitation and repeated phone 
calls in order to intimidate homeowners into acquiring high-cost loans are 
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just some of the predatory practices they use.19 Additionally, even if 
borrowers read the loan documents carefully, these documents are “usually 
complex enough to make an attorney’s eyes cross, leaving little hope that 
a[n] [average] consumer can wade through the legal double talk.”20
This exploitation has led to wide-ranging harms to borrowers, who have 
little legal recourse against lenders and brokers.
 
21 First, lenders and brokers 
shift their litigation risk to the secondary market via securitization of these 
loans.22 Securitization protects the lenders and brokers from litigation risk 
because of the protections afforded by the holder in due course rule and 
weaknesses in the current rules and regulation.23 Second, “[s]ecuritization 
drives up the price of subprime loans because investors demand a lemons 
premium for investing in subprime mortgage-backed securities.”24 As a 
result, the costs to borrowers are substantial, and “one study estimated that 
lengthy prepayment penalties in securitized subprime loans boosted 
borrowers’ risk of foreclosure by sixteen to twenty percent.”25 Third, these 
foreclosures harm the cities where these borrowers default on their loans, as 
“declining property values resulting from predatory lending mean reduced 
tax revenues just as abandoned buildings lead to increased demand for fire 
and police protection.”26
                                                                                                                 
 19. Others include, subprime lenders urging borrowers to “sign loan documents without 
reading them or with key terms left blank,” and selling borrowers unnecessary insurance or other 
products along with the loan. See Motto, supra note 11, at 860; see also Nat’l Assn of Consumer 
Advoc., Predatory Lending Practices, http://www.naca.net/predatory-lending-practices (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2008). 
 20. See Motto, supra note 11, at 860. 
 21. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of 
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2041 (2007) [hereinafter, Turning a Blind Eye]. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.; see also infra Part IV and Part V. 
 24. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2041. The “lemons premium” exists as a result of 
the high default risk of borrowers in the subprime lending market, and is the high price on the 
interest payments that borrowers pay in their loan payments to subprime lenders. This premium 
makes these securitized loans attractive investments. 
 25. Id. Balloon clauses in those loans raised borrowers’ risk of foreclosure by an additional 
fifty percent. See generally Roberto G. Quercia, Michael A. Stegman & Walter R. Davis, The 
Impact of Predatory Loan Terms on Subprime Foreclosures: The Special Case of Prepayment 
Penalties and Balloon Payments, Ctr. for Community Capitalism, Kenan Institute for Private 
Enters. U.N.C., (Jan. 25, 2005). 
 Therefore, changes must be made to this industry 
 26. Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory 
Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355 (2006); see also, e.g., ACORN FAIR HOUS., PREDATORY LENDING 
IN SOUTH CENTRAL PENNSYLVANIA: A REVIEW OF RISING FORECLOSURE FILINGS AND THE 
RELATIONSHIP TO PREDATORY LENDING 4 (Dec. 3, 2003), available at  
http://www.acorn.org/fileadmin/Predatory_Lending/FINAL_REPORT.pdf (documenting a 186% 
increase in foreclosure filings in south central Pennsylvania between 1997 and 2002); STEVEN C. 
BOURASSA, URBAN STUDIES INST., PREDATORY LENDING IN JEFFERSON COUNTY: A REPORT TO 
THE LOUISVILLE URBAN LEAGUE 3 (Dec. 2003), available at 
http://www.lul.org/Predatory%20Lending%20Report.pdf (citing a 288% increase in foreclosures 
in Kentucky between 1995 and 2002); ZACH SCHILLER ET AL., POLICY MATTERS OHIO, HOME 
INSECURITY 2004: FORECLOSURE GROWTH IN OHIO 3 (Aug. 2004), available at 
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to prevent these predatory lenders and special purpose vehicles (SPVs) that 
securitize these loans from continuing to profit at the expense of borrowers, 
cities and investors. 
Part I of this note provides a brief overview of the subprime lending 
problem, a definition of predatory lending and an explanation of the typical 
practices that it entails. Part II describes the emergence, growth and risks of 
securitization of subprime home mortgage loans. It further explains why 
predatory lending persists despite the substantial risk inherent in 
management techniques employed by securitization.27 Part III identifies and 
discusses remedies available to victims of predatory subprime lending and 
the inadequacies of the remedies in protecting consumers and preventing 
further predatory lending. Then, Part IV argues that assignee liability on 
securitized trusts, put forth in a March 2007 article by Kathleen C. Engel 
and Patricia A. McCoy (Engel and McCoy), is currently too radical a 
change to the secondary market.28 Finally, Part V argues that borrowers and 
investors should have recourse against SPVs, as they are in a position to 
identify the quality and suitability of the securitized loans for investors, and 
further discusses potential remedies29
I. PREDATORY LENDING DEFINED 
 and ways to improve extant remedies 
to combat predatory subprime lending. 
“One of the key financial developments of the 1990s was the 
emergence and rapid growth of subprime mortgage lending.”30 Access to 
credit through the subprime lending market is necessary and appropriate for 
those who cannot obtain credit through a prime loan but are still capable of 
making their mortgage payments in a timely manner.31 “Borrowers who 
present elevated risk levels can look to the subprime market for credit . . . 
and take advantage of” lenders looking to provide higher interest loans 
which can supply “mortgage capital and flexible, subprime loan 
products.”32
                                                                                                                 
http://www.policymattersohio.org/pdf/Home_Insecurity_2004.pdf (noting a doubling of 
foreclosure rates in Ohio between 1998 and 2003). 
 27. For more information, see generally Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21. 
 28. Id. at 2042. 
 29. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1255. The authors argued for a Self Regulatory 
Organization (SRO), overseen by the federal government, to regulate the lending industry and 
securitization of loans as a way to deal with the predatory lending problem. This is one such 
remedy that may effectively combat this problem. See id. at 1259. 
 30. Edward M. Gramlich, Governor, Remarks at the Fin. Serv. Roundtable Annual Hous. 
Policy Meeting, 1 (May 21, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040521/default.htm). 
 31. Kevin M. Cuff, Op-Ed., Subprime Lending Misconceptions, THE BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 
2007, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/07/22/ 
subprime_lending_misconceptions/. 
 32. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1279. 
 “However, these high-risk borrowers are charged interest and 
fees by subprime lenders that exceed the rate that traditional prime 
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borrowers pay.”33
Predatory lenders are defined by their methods of lending and their 
target borrowers. “Predatory lenders rely on misrepresentation, threats, 
unfair pressure and borrower ignorance to engage in their deceptive lending 
practices.”
 Subprime lenders provide an important service, but they 
are not all reputable and some can be destructive. 
34 As one court35 notes, predatory lending is a “mismatch 
between the needs and capacity of the borrower . . . .  In essence, the loan 
does not fit the borrower, either because the borrower’s underlying needs 
for the loan are not being met or the terms of the loan are so 
disadvantageous to that particular borrower that there is little likelihood the 
borrower has the capability to repay the loan.”36 Predatory lenders often 
target vulnerable populations, resulting in devastating personal loss, 
including bankruptcy, poverty and foreclosure.37 Subprime lenders who do 
not engage in predatory practices can be referred to as “legitimate subprime 
lenders.”38 By contrast, “[p]redatory lenders penetrate communities and, 
like polluters, leave distressed properties and desperate people in their 
wake.”39 As a result, there is growing concern that “it may not be in the best 
interest of borrowers or the neighborhoods in which they reside for such 
loans to be extended in the first place.”40
Predatory lending is comprised of various abusive practices. These 
practices result in serious disproportionate net harm to borrowers. One 
example is “asset-based lending,
 
41
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. 
 34. Eggert, supra note 1, at 507. 
 35. See generally Assocs. Home Equity Servs. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529 (N.J. Super.2001) 
(allowing borrowers’ discrimination and unconscionability claims and defenses to proceed in a 
foreclosure action under the Consumer Fraud Act, the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, 
the Fair Housing Act, and the Civil Rights Act). 
 36. Id. This case was brought to my attention by Daniel S. Ehrenberg, If the Loan Don’t Fit, 
Don’t Take It: Applying the Suitability Doctrine to the Mortgage Industry to Eliminate Predatory 
Lending, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 117, 119–20 (2001) (pointing out predatory 
lending is easier to discuss than it is to define). 
 37. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending, 
Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (Summer, 2006) 
(describing Associates First Capital’s notorious predatory lending practices in 2000, including 
“high interest rates, upfront fees, balloon payments, and prepayment penalties, [as well as] 
aggressively selling single-premium credit insurance and ‘flipping’ or refinancing loans to 
generate additional fees without benefit to the borrower”). See also Nat’l Assn of Consumer 
Advoc., supra note 19. 
 38. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1279. 
 39. Engel, supra note 26, at 355. 
 40. Paul S. Calem et al., Neighborhood Patterns of Subprime Lending: Evidence from 
Disparate Cities, 15 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 603, 604 (2004). 
 41. This has been defined as the “pattern or practice” of making high-cost mortgages to 
consumers based on the consumer’s collateral without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay 
(based upon the consumer’s current and expected income, current obligations and employment 
status). See HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 17, at 78. 
 which entails making loans to borrowers 
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whom the lender knows cannot afford the monthly payments.”42 Another 
practice is harmful “rent-seeking,”43 where the subprime lenders charge 
fees and interest rates that are exorbitant44 compared to the risk that the 
borrowers present.45 Many predatory loans may also involve illegal fraud or 
deception by brokers or lenders.46 For example, brokers or lenders may 
procure inflated appraisals or make false promises to refinance loans down 
the road on better terms. 47 Other forms of non-transparency are harmful but 
do not amount to fraud, such as when lenders or brokers prevent borrowers 
from comparison shopping by withholding rate sheets.48  A disproportionate 
number of lenders also engage in lending discrimination, by imposing more 
onerous terms on members of protected groups, resulting in further 
injustice.49 Perhaps the most oppressive practice in the subprime lending 
market is requiring borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress in loan 
documents.50
                                                                                                                 
 42. Freddie Mac, Automated Underwriting: Making Mortgage Lending Simpler and Fairer for 
America’s Families, ch. 5 & nn.5–6 (1996), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/ 
reports/moseley/chap5.htm. 
 43. Cisco Systems defines “rent-seeking” as “[w]hen a company, organization, or individual 
uses their resources to obtain economic gain from others without reciprocating any benefits back 
to society through wealth creation. See Cisco Systems Glossary, available at 
http://investor.cisco.com/glossary.cfm?FirstLetter=r. See also Paul M. Johnson, A Glossary of 
Political Economy Terms, http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/rent-seeking_behavior (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2008). 
 44. These fees are not directly reflected in interest rates, and because they can be financed, are 
easy to disguise or downplay by lenders. Moreover, while on competitive loans, fees below 1% of 
the loan amount are typical, predatory loans commonly have fees totaling more than 5% of the 
loan amount. See Nat’l Assn of Consumer Advoc., supra note 19. 
 45. This practice encompasses steering borrowers towards less favorable terms and charging 
prepayment penalties and points without a corresponding cut in the interest rate as is customary in 
the prime market. Howard Lax et. al., Subprime Lending: An Investigation of Economic 
Efficiency, 15 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 533, 535 (2004); Alan M. White, Risk-Based Mortgage 
Pricing: Present and Future Research, 15 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 503, 504 (2004). As noted 
above, the high interest rates and loan charge fees, and commensurate high returns are what make 
the securitized subprime loans attractive investments.  Thus there is incentive for the parties 
involved in securitization to allow such an abusive practice to continue. 
 46. See generally Debra Pogrund Stark, Unmasking the Predatory Loan in Sheep’s Clothing: 
A Legislative Proposal, 21 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 129 (2005). 
 47. HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 17, at 79–80. 
 48. Neither the Truth in Lending Act nor the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act requires 
disclosure of rate sheets to borrowers. See A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1255. 
 49. See, e.g., Debbie Gruenstein Bocian, Keith S. Ernst & Wei Li, Unfair Lending: The Effect 
of Race and Ethnicity on the Price of Subprime Mortgages at 4 (2006), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr011-Unfair_Lending-0506.pdf (documenting numerous 
disparities, including that African-American borrowers with prepayment penalties on their 
subprime home loans were six to thirty-four percent more likely to receive a higher-rate loan than 
if they had been white borrowers with similar qualifications. Results varied depending on the type 
of interest rate (i.e., fixed or adjustable) and the purpose (refinance or purchase) of the loan). 
 50. See A. Brooke Overby, Mortgage Foreclosure in Post-Katrina New Orleans, 48 B.C. L. 
REV. 851, 872 (2007). See generally Patricia McCoy, Elder Law; A Behavioral Analysis of 
Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON L. REV. 725 (2005). 
 For example, subprime loans often contain mandatory 
arbitration clauses that require borrowers to take disputes to arbitration and 
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preclude them from joining class actions, thus denying borrowers access to 
the courts.51
Unlike predatory loans, legitimate subprime loans do not display any of 
the markers of abuse listed above.
 
52 Nevertheless, although “predatory 
loans are not necessarily subprime,” they are most prevalent in the 
subprime market.53 Once these loans are securitized and sold in secondary 
financial markets, the dangers of predatory lending are magnified.54
II. SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME HOME MORTGAGE 
LOANS 
 
Securitization “is the process of converting packages of home loans into 
securities that are backed by collateral in the form of [those] loans.”55 The 
two-tiered structure of securitization protects investors by preventing 
creditors of lenders from reaching the assets backing the securities if the 
lender went bankrupt.56 This remoteness from bankruptcy in turn “boosts 
ratings of securitized offerings, [as] rating agencies evaluate and rate 
securitized loan pools.”57 “SPVs protect investors from the risk of the 
lender’s bankruptcy, [and] often [make it] possible for [a] loan [pool] to 
earn a higher rating than the lender itself would receive” if rated on an 
individual basis. “In this way, ‘non-investment grade and unrated 
originators (the majority of the market) [are able to] create investment-
grade transactions.’”58
In a securitization, once the original lender has made loans to 
borrowers, “investment banks take pools of home loans, carve up the cash 
flows from those receivables, and convert the cash flows into bonds that are 
secured by the mortgages; the bonds are variously known as residential 
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) or asset-backed securities (ABS).”
 
59
                                                                                                                 
 51. See Democratic Candidates on Mortgage Reform, 27-1 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 56 (Feb. 
2008). 
 52. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1261. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Point – Counterpoint: Federal Preemption: The 
OCC’s Preemption Rules Exxceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the 
Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 312–13 
(2004) (stating that as of 2004, “the four most costly bank failures since 1997—resulting in total 
losses to the [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation] (the ‘FDIC’) of $ 1.7 billion involved 
institutions heavily engaged in subprime lending and securitization.”). 
 55. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1274. 
 56. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 
142 (1994). 
 57. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2046. 
 58. Id. (quoting Henry C. McCall III & Len Blum, Evolution of the B&C Home-Equity Loan 
Securities Market, in ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 237 (Anand K. Bhattacharyi & Frank J. 
Fabozzi Eds., 1996)). 
 59. Id. at 2045. 
 
Securitizers structure the transaction to isolate the loan pool from the 
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original lender by selling the loan pool to a SPV60 that passively holds the 
loans, and is owned by, but legally distinct from, the lender.61 “The SPV 
then resells the loan pool to a second SPV [typically in the form of a trust], 
which is also [legally] independent of the lender and takes title to the 
bundle.”62 Next, by adding credit enhancements to the loan pool, the SPV 
reduces the risks associated with loan payment defaults by borrowers.63 
“Internal” credit enhancements include recourse arrangements and senior-
subordinated structures, and “external” credit enhancements include 
irrevocable letters of credit, or financial guaranty insurance from third 
parties with triple-A credit ratings.64 “The SPV then creates and issues the 
mortgage-backed securities and sells the securities to investors.”65 While in 
some cases, the seller of the loans retains the servicing rights (i.e., collects 
the loan payments) and distributes the proceeds to investors, in other cases, 
the SPV services the loans.66
The 1980s saw an increase in both the variety of lenders and available 
capital.
 
67 Subprime securitization, first pioneered in the 1970s, allowed 
lenders to make more loans in low- and moderate-income (LMI) 
neighborhoods.68
                                                                                                                 
 60. These are “also referred to as a ‘bankruptcy-remote entity’ whose operations are limited to 
the acquisition and financing of specific assets.” They “serve as a counterparty for swaps and 
other credit sensitive derivative instruments.” See Investopedia, SPV, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/spv.asp. 
 61. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2045; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 1552–53 (2004) (focusing on the 
“nonconforming” or “private label” market). 
 62. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2045. 
 63. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1274. 
 64. The SPV will typically raise the credit rating of the securities relative to the lender’s own 
rating, or relative to what would be assigned to the underlying collateral. The amount of credit 
enhancements required depends on several factors, including “rating agencies’ views of the 
historical performance of the assets, the degree of diversification across obligors, industries, etc. 
and the structure of the transaction.” See Stephen A. Lumpkin, Fundamentals of Asset-Backed 
Securities Markets, Second International Roundtable on Securities Markets in China, OECD 
Shanghai at 14–16 (June 6–7, 2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/45/ 
2756089.pdf. 
 65. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1274. 
 66. Id. at 1288 (Some investors “are requiring that lenders retain the loan-servicing rights, in 
which case the lenders would have some interest in creditworthiness because servicing costs rise 
with the risk of default”); cf. Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by Mortgage 
Servicers, 15 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 603, 753–54 (discussing servicing abuses, and explaining that 
once loans are securitized, a servicer typically becomes responsible for collecting the loan 
payments and distributing the proceeds, and as a result, some servicers have employed abusive 
and illegal servicing practices, including charging unjustified fees, actively pushing borrowers into 
default, and employing exploitative collection methods). 
 67. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1273. 
 68. See id.; see also Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate 
Finance Law in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1261, 1267–71 (1991). 
 In the 1970s, Freddie Mac spearheaded the securitization 
of mortgages in an effort to increase the amount of available mortgage 
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capital.69  Widespread securitization of mortgages began in the 1980s,70 and 
“by 1993, sixty percent of home-mortgage loans were securitized.”71 
Through technological advances in the early 1990s, it became possible to 
estimate and price the risk of subprime home loan pools, paving the way for 
subprime securitizations.72 Prior to the subprime crisis, most subprime loans 
were securitized,73 which led “to claims that securitization facilitates 
predatory lending”74 and that the entities involved should actively police 
lenders.75  Although securitization continues,76 currently, there are two 
proposed accounting rule changes by the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board77 (FASB) which some believe may wipe out the market for asset-
backed securitization.78 The first rule change, to Financial Accounting 
Standard 140 (FAS 140), proposes “elimination of qualified special-purpose 
entities, which provide a way for banks to keep securitized assets off their 
balance sheets.”79 According to a TowerGroup report, forcing securitized 
assets onto the balance sheet could erode banks’ annual net earnings by 
more than $60 billion and require billions of dollars in additional loan 
reserves and recapitalization.80 Changes to FASB Interpretation No. 46 
(FIN 46(R)), “would provide new, more stringent criteria for when banks 
are allowed to transfer ownership of securitized assets and liabilities.”81
                                                                                                                 
 69. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1273. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1273 (quoting Leon T. Kendall); see also Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New 
Era in American Finance, in 172 A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 2, 2–3 (Leon T. Kendall & 
Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996). 
 72. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2045. 
 73. In 2005, total securitizations of subprime and home equity loans ballooned to an estimated 
$525.7 billion. As of 2006, and prior to the credit crisis lenders securitized almost eighty percent 
of subprime mortgages. See Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Rating Transitions 2005: U.S. RMBS 
Volume and Rating Activity Continue to Set Records, tbl. 1 (Jan. 24, 2006). 
 74. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2040. These claims are correct as will be explained 
later in this note. See infra Parts IV and V. 
 75. Id. 
 76. According to a survey by Asset Backed Alert, as of October 23, 2008, the year to date 
volume of asset-backed securities issued totaled $696.4 billion versus $917.2 billion in 2007. See 
Asset Backed Alert, Banker’s Glossary, http://www.abalert.com/Public/MarketPlace/ 
MarketStatistics/index.cfm. 
 77. “Officially recognized as authoritative by the Securities and Exchange Commission,” the 
FASB services “the investing public through transparent information resulting from high-quality 
financial reporting standards.”  “Since 1973, the FASB has been the designated organization in the 
private sector for establishing standards of financial accounting and reporting.”  Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, Facts about FASB, http://www.fasb.org/facts/index.shtml#mission. 
 78. See Alan Rappeport, Securitization’s Last Throes?, CFO.com, (Oct. 24, 2008) available at 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/12494397?f=most_read. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Joseph Rosta, Proposals Take Aim at Securitization, U.S. Banker, (Oct. 2008) (quoting 
research director for bankcards at TowerGroup Dennis Moroney), available at 
http://www.americanbanker.com/usb_article.html?id=200810281O5Q771O. 
 81. Rappeport, supra note 78.  For a more detailed discussion, see Rosta, supra note 80. 
 
Despite fears of a possible halt in securitization, others argue the proposed 
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rule change would have “little impact”82 or will not take effect until “after 
the financial sector is well on the mend.”83 Nonetheless, entities involved in 
securitization profit from these practices, so they continue to resist 
addressing these problems and serve as major conduits for predatory 
loans.84 As an excerpt from the now embattled85
With the exception of approximately 20.82% of the mortgage loans in the 
statistical mortgage pool that were underwritten in accordance with the 
underwriting criteria of The Winter Group, underwriting criteria are 
generally not available with respect to the mortgage loans. In many 
instances the mortgage loans in the statistical mortgage pool were acquired 
by Terwin Advisors LLC from sources, including mortgage brokers and 
other non-originators that could not provide detailed information regarding 
the underwriting guidelines of the originators.
 Merrill Lynch & Co. 
prospectus in 2004 illustrates, the entities involved in securitization rarely 
investigate the process of underwriting subprime loans before the crisis: 
86
Merrill Lynch’s admission exemplifies how Wall Street firms have 
been securitizing subprime home loans without determining if loan pools 
contain predatory loans. In the worst situations, secondary market actors 
have actively facilitated abusive lending.
 
87 In fact, as of 2002, Kathleen 
Engel and Patricia McCoy said “it is now routine for lenders to originate 
loans, and sell them to secondary-market institutions, which provide a 
steady stream of capital to lend.”88
The process of spreading risk through “tranches” has further hidden the 
inherent risk in predatory lending. Once loans are transferred to the second 
 As a result, subprime securitization 
helped perpetuate the predatory lending cycle. 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. (quoting former FASB member Ed Trott). James Mountain, a partner at Deloitte & 
Touche agreed.  See id. 
 83. Rosta, supra note 80. 
 84. Predatory lending lawsuits continue to arise over these practices. See, e.g., Stuckey v. 
Provident Bank, 912 So. 2d 859 (Miss. 2005); Bankers Trust Co. v. West, No. 20984, 2002 WL 
31114844 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2002). 
 85. The troubled Merrill Lynch & Co. was bought by Bank of America in a $50 billion all 
stock transaction. See Bank of America Buys Merrill Lynch Creating Unique Financial Services 
Firm, (Sept. 15, 2008), http://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/index.php?s=press_releases& 
item=8255; see also Ellen Messmer, Lehman failure, Bank of America/Merrill Lynch buyout 
shake Wall Street again, NETWORK WORLD, (Sept. 15, 2008), 
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/091508-wall-street-shakeup.html?fsrc=netflash-rss. 
 86. Merrill Lynch & Co., Prospectus to Prospectus dated June 18, 2004 (Form 424B5), at S-16 
(June 24, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/809940/ 
000095013604002052/0000950136-04-002052.txt. 
 87. See Austin v. Chisick, (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.), 298 B.R. 652, 659–65 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 2003) (findings of fact). After allegedly learning of FAMCO’s fraud during due 
diligence, Lehman Brothers nevertheless gave “substantial assistance” through securitization to 
help finance FAMCO’s operations. This case was brought to my attention by Kathleen C. Engel & 
Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2061 n.107 (2007). 
 88. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1274. 
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SPV, tranches of bonds are created by the investment bank for the issuer.89 
Rating agencies then measure the credit risk of each tranche by comparing 
historical data with the loan pools and forecasting the tranche’s 
performance.90 Sequential tranches are one way in which securitization 
protects investors (assignees) from credit risk, as investors benefit from 
conservative risk assessments by rating agencies91 and can avoid risk 
through investing in the more highly-rated tranches.92 However, if the 
suitability of these loans to the borrowers was taken into account, tranches 
would logically receive lower ratings when comprised of unsuitable loans 
to subprime borrowers.93 The less suitable the loans, the less likely the 
borrowers are able to pay off the loans and thus, the more unlikely it is that 
investors in these bonds will get paid back.94
By making possible a constant flow of money to the home mortgage 
market, securitization dramatically altered the once highly regulated 
business of mortgage lending. Prior to the current credit crisis, banks and 
other lenders no longer suffered from liquidity restraints and more funds 
became available to lend.
 
95 At the height of the subprime bubble, lenders no 
longer needed “to be large financial institutions with significant deposits 
and capitalization, and instead sparsely capitalized mortgage bankers and 
finance companies originated loans for sale on the secondary market.”96
                                                                                                                 
 89. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2046. The “issuer” is the SPV that issues securities. 
 90. However, rating agencies do not assess the suitability of the underlying loans for 
individual borrowers in calculating the credit risk. See id. 
 91. This is because the rating agencies work for the lenders, and are thereby incentivized to 
provide them with conservative risk assessments. See Ethan Penner, Can the Financial Markets 
Make a Comeback?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2007, at A11; see also infra Part VI. 
 92. Although not the focus of this comment, in their Fordham Law Review Article, Kathleen 
C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy provide a clear, detailed explanation of how, through conservative 
risk assessments by rating agencies, senior tranches have had numerous upgrades in their ratings, 
yet only one downgrade between 2003 and 2005, despite rising subprime loan default rates. See 
Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2055–56. 
 93. Id. at 2046–47. 
 94. Investor’s likelihood of repayment is a major aspect of bond ratings. The “tranche system,” 
the predominant structure of choice in subprime RMBS, is termed a “senior subordinate structure” 
and tranches are arrayed from the most senior (AAA tranche) to the most junior (BBB, BB, B and 
unrated tranche classes). A rating of BBB-/Baa3 or above is deemed investment-grade, a title that 
serves to calm investors’ concerns about the credit quality of the mortgages backing the securities 
that they are investing in. The tranche system is paid off in a “waterfall” system, and the senior 
tranche is paid off before any other. Consequently, the junior tranche is the first to absorb any 
losses, making it appear doubtful the senior tranche will absorb credit losses. See id. at 2046–47. 
 95. Moreover, non-bank lenders have entered the home-mortgage market through the 
opportunities created by securitization. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1274. 
 96. Id. 
 As 
a result, the illegitimate subprime lenders successfully took advantage of 
borrowers through predatory lending. In addition, predatory lenders 
continue to avoid liability, and are not forced to obey proper lending 
practices because of continued failure of risk management in this industry. 
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III. WHY PREDATORY LENDING PERSISTS DESPITE RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
In a 2007 article, Engel and McCoy identify numerous problems with 
attempts in risk management to protect investors from risk and curb 
continued predatory lending practices.97 They examine how, despite 
attempts at creating lending-market discipline by the secondary market, 
predatory lending has persisted through diversification, the tranche system, 
lax disclosure and the excess demand for securitization.98 The article 
discusses the need to exert discipline on subprime lenders and proposes 
forcing them to retain some of the risk associated with loan pools.99 It 
focuses on how, although risk management measures are designed to 
incentivize lenders to make proper loans and cut default risk, none of these 
measures, singly or together, have curbed abusive lending.100
A. THE EVIL ALLIANCE 
 
The first problem identified by Engel and McCoy is the conflict of 
interest created when lenders work for the SPVs, or, as they call it, the 
“unholy alliance of marginal lenders and loan aggregators.”101 It has 
increasingly become the practice for subprime lenders to sell whole loans to 
outside loan aggregators, generally affiliates or subsidiaries wholly- owned 
by Wall Street investment banks,102 who bundle and securitize them. 
Because subprime aggregation offered advantages to both the investment 
banks and lenders, it increasingly became popular, “accounting for 42% of 
the subprime securitizations in 2002.”103 It furthered investment banks’ 
underwriting business and helped them assemble diversified loan pools.104 
The advantage of a diversified loan pool is that the bad loans with low 
ratings are aggregated with the better higher rated loans, and thus the 
overall pool receives a high enough rating to be securitized and sold to 
investors.105
                                                                                                                 
 97. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2063. 
 98. Id. at 2064–65. 
 99. Id. at 2064. 
 100. See id.; see also Quercia, supra note 25, at 4–5. 
 101. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2065. “Loan aggregators” refers to SPVs who 
securitize the loans and sell them to investors on the secondary market. 
 102. At the height of the securitization market, major players included Credit Suisse First 
Boston, Morgan Stanley, Lehman Brothers, Bear, Stearns & Co., Merrill Lynch, Greenwich 
Capital, UBS, Bank of America, and Deutsche Bank Securities. See Bill Shepherd, Perils and 
Phantasm: The Mortgage Securitization Boom is Threatened by Recession, Legislation and Rate 
Change, Investment Dealers Dig., Feb. 3, 2003 available at http://www.ad-
co.com/announcements/IDD.pdf; see also Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2065. 
 103. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2065 n.122. 
 104. Id. at 2065. 
 105. See generally id. 
 The advantage of aggregation is particularly strong for small or 
poorly capitalized lenders, as aggregation permits them to sell loan pools 
for securitization “that would otherwise be too small to provide 
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diversification.”106 Thus, aggregation allows investment banks to enjoy 
subprime profits with reduced legal risk through diversification. 
Consequently, “Wall Street prizes aggregation” and “[b]ecause they have 
minimal exposure to suits, aggregators have reduced incentives to guard 
against abusive practices” by lenders.107
B. THROWING OUT THE TRASH 
 
The second issue the article discusses is that lenders do not always 
retain an interest in the subordinated tranches that they have helped create, 
so they are disinterested in the quality of the loans in those tranches.108 
Through an affiliate, lenders often buy securities in the lowest-rated 
tranches, and in conjunction provide those tranches with credit 
enhancements.109 Although it appears that the lender retains the riskiest 
securities, this is not necessarily the case because lenders typically sell to 
outside investors (principally real estate investment trusts, hedge funds and 
overseas investors) who want to buy many of these so-called “residuals,”110 
either at the time of offering, or through later secondary market resales.111 
Moreover, lenders can sell their subprime residuals to outside investors 
“through bonds known as Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs),” which 
essentially securitize residuals from RMBS and other assets.112
                                                                                                                 
 106. More importantly, “aggregation enables marginal lenders to obtain financing despite 
obscure or questionable reputations by ‘renting’ the aggregator’s reputation for quality securities.” 
See id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. These credit enhancements are “usually in the form of an insurance policy or a letter of 
credit from a financial institution that backs some or all of the securities issued in the transaction 
(e.g., total value of the asset pool or securities issue, or possibly a governmental guarantee on 
mortgage loans).”  See Angela Petrucci, Note, Accounting for Asset Securitization in a Full 
Disclosure World, 30 J. LEGIS. 327, 331 (2004). 
 110. The residuals are the lowest rated tranches that “receive the excess cash flow that remains 
after all of the payments due to the holders of other tranches and all of the administrative expenses 
have been met,” and are the BB- and B- subprime tranches. See American Banker, Banker’s 
Glossary, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/glossary.html?alpha=R (last visited Oct. 
30, 2008). These are attractive investments for those who have a greater appetite for risk, because 
the potential payoff far exceeds those of the senior, more highly rated tranches. 
 111. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2065; see also Ruth Simon et al., Housing-
Bubble Talk Doesn’t Scare Off Foreigners, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2005, at A1. 
 112. “Significantly, U.S. subprime RMBS have comprised the single ‘largest collateral asset 
class in [CDOs] since the inception of the product in 1999.’” Although the central purpose of 
residuals is to force lenders to retain the bulk of the credit risk they create, when lenders with 
subprime residuals are permitted to transfer them off their books through CDOs, “they are able to 
escape the market discipline that residuals were meant to exert.” See Turning a Blind Eye, supra 
note 21, at 2066. 
 Because 
  For example, if a bank issuing mortgage backed securities had $1 billion in mortgages, and 
they created a CDO for the $1 billion with $300 million for the residual tranche, $300 million for 
the junior tranche and $400 million for the senior tranche it would be cut up as follows: the bank 
would sell 400,000 shares at $1,000 per share and 6% interest to the senior tranche, which would 
amount to a $24 million per year interest payment for the senior tranche. If to the junior tranche 
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predatory lenders can dispose of these residuals (the riskiest tranche 
classes), the incentive for these lenders to avoid making predatory loans is 
removed.113 “As one CDO manager put it, CDOs create ‘an awful lot of 
moral hazard in the [subprime RMBS] sector.’”114
C. THE NOT SO DILIGENT 
 Thus, this attempt at risk 
management in lending is subverted as predatory lenders are able to sell the 
residuals and their accompanying risk on the secondary market. 
Engel and McCoy next address how the due diligence required by 
current state and federal law is often cursory and is consequently 
ineffective.115 Because of inherent conflicts of interest, the best practices 
adopted by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have not been adopted in the 
subprime secondary market voluntarily, and will not screen out predatory 
loans from loan pools unless compelled by changes in regulation.116 Despite 
recent court reactions such as In Re First Alliance Mortgage Co.,117 and 
state assignee liability laws, “industry and government observers agree that 
subprime due diligence is uneven and in need of improvement.”118 This is 
true for both public offerings of subprime RMBS (where institutional 
investors often have a real chance to insist on meaningful due diligence in 
advance), and even more so for Rule 144A private placements.119 In fact, 
the high demand for Rule 144A offerings has forced institutional investors 
to make snap judgments whether to invest, without time for any substantive 
due diligence.120
                                                                                                                 
they sold 300,000 shares at $1,000 per share and 7% interest which would amount to a $21 million 
per year interest payment. Everything else would go to the residual, which here would be 300,000 
shares at $1000 and 18.3% interest which equates to a $55 million per year interest payment. 
Thus, although the residual has the potential to be paid the most per year, they have to wait to be 
paid until all the more senior tranches have been paid first, which if there are significant defaults.  
This hypothetical was addressed by Professor Minor Myers, B.A., J.D., of Brooklyn Law School. 
 113. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2066. 
 114. Allison Pyburn, CDO Investors Debate Morality of Spread Environment, Asset 
Securitization Rep., May 9, 2005, http://www.asreport.com (on file with author). 
 115. See generally Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Austin v. Chisick, (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.), 298 B.R. 652, 659–65 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. 2003). 
 118. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2068. 
 119. “Rule 144A provides an exemption and permits the public resale of restricted or control 
securities if a number of conditions are met, including how long the securities are held, the way in 
which they are sold, and the amount that can be sold at any one time. But even if you’ve met the 
conditions of the rule, you can’t sell your restricted securities to the public until you’ve gotten a 
transfer agent to remove the legend.” Securities Act Rule 144, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission Homepage, http://www.sec.gov/asnwers/rule144.htm (Oct. 6, 2003). Rule 144A 
private placements, thus allow predatory subprime loans to get past SEC regulation, if they qualify 
for the exemption, which can easily be accomplished by the sophisticated parties involved in these 
transactions. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2068. 
 120. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2068. 
 Most simply rely on the efforts of lenders, underwriters, 
and rating agencies, “even though none of these entities has the same level 
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of interest in avoiding credit losses as the investors themselves.”121
As of 2007, underwriters, rating agencies, and lenders conducted most 
subprime due diligence, not investors, and typically, due diligence was 
limited to determining “lender compliance with state and federal consumer 
protections laws.”
 As a 
result of this reliance, due diligence in the private-label subprime market 
often sets a very low bar and rarely succeeds in screening out predatory 
loan terms or practices. 
122 “For example, automated compliance systems tailor 
their screening tools to the legal requirements of each jurisdiction.”123  Only 
screening for legal compliance has been required for rating agencies, and 
they have not been required to follow the industry’s “best practices.”124 For 
example, the principal federal anti-predatory lending law, the Home 
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA),125 has strong proscriptions 
against predatory lending, but at best covers the costliest five percent of 
subprime home loans.126 Many states are in need of resilient anti-predatory 
lending laws, and as legal protections against abusive subprime loans are 
also weak at the federal level, this lack of meaningful due diligence allows 
securitized loan pools to include predatory loans without meaningful 
consequences.127
Even where due diligence is required, it is not uncommon for some 
lenders to say they performed loan-level review when they did not.
 
128
                                                                                                                 
 121. Only those that are “observationally illegal,” are attempted to be screened out. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2068; see also ComplianceEase, 
ComplianceAnalyzer, http://www.Complianceease.com. 
 124. This is problematic, as there are large existing gaps in governing law, and therefore 
numerous lending abuses remain legal under state and federal law. Although not the focus of this 
comment, legislators continue to debate the proper path to take in order to close the gaps that exist 
in current state and federal laws. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2068–69. 
 125. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2000). This act amended the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and 
established requirements for certain loans with high rates and/or high fees, setting out disclosure 
requirements, prohibited features, and actions that one may take against a lender who is violating 
the law. See Federal Trade Commission Homepage, Facts for Consumers: High-Rate, High-Fee 
Loans (HOEPA/Section 32 Mortgages), (Jan. 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/ 
homes/rea19.shtm. 
 126. See, e.g., Truth in Lending, 66 Fed. Reg. 65604, 65608 (Dec. 20, 2001) (to be codified at 
12 C.F.R. pt. 226); but see Lisa Keyfetz, The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994: 
Extending Liability for Predatory Subprime Loans to Secondary Mortgage Market Participants, 
18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 151, 152 (arguing that, although it has limits, HOEPA can be a 
“powerful vehicle for regulating the home equity lending market and for challenging abusive 
lending practices through the courts.”). 
 127. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2069. 
 128. “In 2004, the General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office or 
GAO) looked at this issue and concluded that ‘some companies may be more willing than others 
to purchase loans that are considered questionable in terms of legal compliance, creditworthiness, 
or other factors.”  Moreover, as one subprime lender explained to the press, “[w]e’re not 
structured to do 100 percent due diligence [on certain subprime pools], even though Wall Street 
investment banks might want that.” See id. 
 In the 
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conforming market,129 both government-sponsored-entities (GSEs) (i.e. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) require substantive screening of subprime 
loans.130 They “have best practices standards for residential mortgages to 
borrowers with blemished credit that are stricter in some respects than the 
laws in many jurisdictions.”131 Yet, as of September 7, 2008, “the 
government seized Fannie and Freddie which together own or guarantee 
half the nation’s mortgages, after months of uncertainty about their 
future.”132 Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) Director James B. 
Lockhart explained “after exhaustive review [of Fannie and Freddie] I have 
determined that the companies cannot continue to operate safely and 
soundly and fulfill their critical public mission, without significant action to 
address our concerns” and placed the GSEs in a conservatorship.133 While 
their fate remains undetermined, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke 
recently suggested “[h]aving Fannie and Freddie compete as private 
firms—perhaps after breaking them into smaller units” as a way to 
“eliminate the conflict between private shareholders and public policy, 
diminish risks to the overall economy and financial system and allow them 
to be more innovative by operating with less political interference.”134
Until the recent financial crisis, outside of the conforming market, 
“lenders, issuers, and/or major investors [were] free to adopt internal 
 
                                                                                                                 
 129. The conforming market refers to “[a] mortgage that is equal to or less than the dollar 
amount established by the conforming loan limit set by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Federal 
regulator, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (“OFHEO”) and meets the funding 
criteria of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.”  See Investopedia, Conforming Loan, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/conformingloan.asp. 
 130. See Benjamin J. Keys, et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence From 
Subprime Loans, 1, 4 World Bank, (April 2008) (discussing the fact that the underwriting 
guidelines established by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac cautioned against lending to borrowers 
with FICO scores below 620 because such a score is a “strong indication that the borrower’s credit 
is not acceptable.”), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFR/Resources/ 
VigSecuritize0808.pdf. 
 131. See, e.g., Fannie Mae, Eligibility of Mortgages to Borrowers with Blemished Credit 
Records, Lender Letter No. 03-00 (Apr. 11, 2000), available at 
http://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2000/lendltrs2000.pdf; Press Release, 
Freddie Mac, Freddie Mac Promotes Consumer Choice with New Subprime Mortgage Arbitration 
Policy (Dec. 4, 2003), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/news/archives/afford_housing/ 
2003/consumer_120403.html; Press Release, Freddie Mac, Freddie Mac’s stance against 
predatory lending practices (Dec. 28, 2000), available at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/pdf/1228indltr.pdf. 
 132. Sudeep Reddy, Bernanke Says the U.S. Needs to Maintain a Role in Mortgage Securities, 
WALL ST. J. Nov. 1, 2008, at A2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB122547596549288517.html?mod=googlenews_wsj. 
 133. James B. Lockhart, FHFA Director, Statement of FHFA Director James B. Lockhart, 1, 5 
(Sept. 7, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/ 
fhfa_statement_090708hp1128.pdf). 
 134. See Reddy, supra note 132. Bernanke further stated that “whether the GSE model is viable 
without at least implicit government support is an open question.”  See id. For a more detailed 
discussion of Bernanke’s blueprint for handling the mortgage-securitization crisis, see id. 
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standards of their own.”135 Nevertheless, in general, “only market actors 
with high reputational risk, such as bank holding companies contemplating 
mergers or lenders previously sanctioned for abusive lending, go to such 
lengths” to attain proper standards.136 For the majority of market 
participants, industry self-policing is virtually nonexistent, and as a result, 
in the nonconforming market for subprime RMBS, lenders and underwriters 
“rarely screen out loans that are not [expressly] prohibited by law, even if 
those loans violate industry standards or inflict significant harm on 
borrowers.”137 Moreover, underwriters are “under constant pressure to relax 
their due diligence, for fear that lenders will move their underwriting 
business to other underwriting firms,” with more lax standards of due 
diligence.138
Investors, looking to screen out predatory loans, tend to rely on due 
diligence by rating agencies, underwriters and lenders.
 In sum, because of these inherent conflicts of interest, the best 
practices have not been voluntarily adopted in the subprime secondary 
market and will not screen out predatory loans from loan pools unless 
compelled by changes in regulation. 
139 While 
institutional investors will generally review the disclosures, ratings, 
structure, and credit enhancements if presented with advance opportunity, if 
they are not, institutional investors tend to be passive, especially regarding 
predatory lending concerns.140 The futility of such reliance is shown by at 
least one study examining securitized subprime mortgage loan contracts, 
which suggests that “securitization adversely affects the screening 
incentives of lenders.”141
D. THE DANGERS OF DEMAND 
 
Lastly, Engel and McCoy identify excess demand for subprime 
securitizations as the final reason why investors do not screen subprime 
RMBS for predatory practices.142
                                                                                                                 
 135. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2070; see generally Securitization Post-Enron, 
supra note 61, for a discussion of the differences between the conforming and nonconforming 
markets. 
 136. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2070. 
 137. Id. (emphasis added). 
 138. Id.; see also Penner, supra note 91, at A11. 
 139. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2070. 
 140. Moreover, “investors rarely reserve the right post-closing to be notified of predatory 
lending complaints, to conduct random spot checks, or to perform special audits of lenders when 
warning signs of predatory lending crop up.”  However, it is this after-the-fact monitoring that 
may be the only way to detect certain types of loan fraud and predatory servicing. Further, 
numerous subprime securitizations are floated on a to-be-announced (TBA) basis, and investors 
cannot exercise due diligence even when they want to. This is because in TBA offerings loans 
have not yet been pooled, and although investors can reserve the right to review the eventual loan 
pool chosen by the lender post-closing, this is risky because the investor has lost leverage once 
they have parted with their funds. See id. at 2071. 
 141. See Keys, et al., supra note 130, at 2. 
 142. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2075. 
 “In 2004, for instance, Standard & Poor’s 
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(S&P)143 observed that ‘the market for subprime mortgage securities 
[experienced] significantly more demand than availability for many 
issuances.’”144 The liquidity of Rule 144A private placements makes them 
in short supply.145 As a result of the demand for bonds in subprime 
securitization exceeding the supply, “investors are willing to purchase 
bonds without engaging in thorough due diligence.”146
Consequently, the risk management techniques used by loan 
securitizers do not trickle down to deter lending abuses. Until the recent 
financial crisis, it was believed investors were protected so well by 
structured finance that S&P routinely assured investors that subprime 
RMBS “[would] continue to perform in accordance with expectations, 
given the advances in loan level modeling, structural safeguards, and 
improvement in loss mitigation techniques.”
 
147 It is clear now that such 
assurances were unwarranted, as “the world’s two largest bond-analysis 
providers,” S&P and Moody’s Corp,148 were engaging in a “race to the 
bottom,” and “repeatedly eased their standards as they pursued profits from 
structured investment pools sold by their clients, according to company 
documents, e-mails and interviews with more than 50 Wall Street 
professionals.”149
These lending abuses have led to significant harms. When lenders make 
loans that borrowers cannot afford to repay, borrowers must either reduce 
spending on necessities such as health insurance, medical bills, day care and 
critical home repairs, or lose their homes to foreclosure. “When predatory 
lending results in vacant homes and neighborhood decline, cities lose tax 
revenues and must pay for added police protection and other city 
services.”
 
150
                                                                                                                 
 143. Standard and Poor’s is “the world’s foremost provider of independent credit ratings, 
indices, risk evaluation, investment research and data.”  Standard & Poor’s, 
http://www.standardandpoors.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
 144. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2075 (quoting S&P, Trends in U.S. Residential 
Mortgage Products: Subprime Sector, Fourth-Quarter 2004, at 3 (Apr. 12, 2005)). 
 145. Additionally, there is demand for subprime RMBS of all types, driven by portfolio 
regulation of institutional investors such as banks and insurance companies, and many institutional 
investors have legal limits on the types of investments they can buy for their own account. 
Because of these limits, high yields make subprime RMBS attractive, particularly “when other 
legal investments are in the doldrums.” Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2075. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 2076 (quoting S&P, Trends in U.S. Residential Mortgage Products: Subprime Sector, 
Fourth-Quarter 2004, at 3 (Apr. 12, 2005)). 
 148. “Moody’s Investors Service is among the world’s most respected and widely utilized 
sources for credit ratings, research and risk analysis.” Moody’s Investor Service, Introduction to 
Moody’s, 
http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/AboutMoodys/AboutMoodys.aspx?topic=intro&redir_url=/
cust/AboutMoodys/staticRedirect.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
 149. Elliot Blair Smith, ‘Race to Bottom’ at Moody’s, S&P Secured Subprime’s Boom, Bust, 
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&refer=home 
&sid=ax3vfya_Vtdo (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
 150. Engel, supra note 26, at 355–60. 
 The total cost to homeowners and cities is in the billions of 
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dollars.151
IV. A MENU OF INADEQUATE REMEDIES 
 Thus, while investors receive some protections, these come at the 
expense of borrowers and cities. 
Although the states and federal government are working towards 
establishing standards and regulations to redress predatory lending, as the 
law stands today, the remedies that exist are inadequate. “Instead, victims of 
predatory lending currently must rely on a loose assortment of statutes and 
common-law rules that were not designed to address the devastating harm 
[to cities, borrowers and even investors] inflicted by predatory lenders.”152 
Remedies are rooted in traditional liberal notions of “informed consent and 
free will,” and “consistent with that liberal ideology, under current 
remedies, predatory-lending contracts are generally enforceable except 
where fraud or nondisclosure has operated in some way that is inimical to 
free will.”153  However, “[b]arring this sort of culpable [process-oriented] 
misrepresentation [by the securitizer or lenders], . . . the law normally does 
not question the substance of predatory-loan terms.”154
A. THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL CONTRACT LAW REMEDIES 
 
Remedies under contract law and the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) are inadequate. “Most contract defenses go to defects in formation 
of assent, rather than to disparities in bargaining power or fairness in 
contracts’ substantive provisions.”155 Although the three doctrines of 
unconscionability, impracticability, and frustration under the law of 
contracts and the UCC permit challenges to the underlying substance of 
contract provisions,156 the latter two “generally do not apply to predatory-
lending cases.”157
“If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may 
refuse to enforce the contract.”
 Moreover, the doctrine of unconscionability’s value in 
practice is nominal at best. 
158
                                                                                                                 
 151. See Quercia, supra note 25, at 5, 27; Eric Stein, Quantifying the Economic Cost of 
Predatory Lending (2001) (estimating losses from predatory lending at $9.1 billion annually) 
available at http://www.selegal.org/Cost%20of%20Predatory%20Lending.pdf. 
 152. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1298. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 1299. 
 156. See id.; see generally Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual 
Relations, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 617 (1982) (discussing the viability of different justifications for a 
party seeking a cessation of contractual relations). 
 157. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1299. 
 158. Id. at 1300. 
 Further, a court “may enforce the 
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or . . . limit the 
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application of [the] clause to avoid any unconscionable result.”159 As 
applied to home loans, this attempts to account for the complexity of loan 
terms by voiding certain predatory terms. In addition, rules exist when 
parties who purchased loans on the secondary market sue delinquent 
borrowers.160 “In those cases, the borrowers’ ability to raise defenses is 
severely limited by the holder-in-due-course doctrine,”161
(2) the holder took the instrument (i) for value, (ii) in good faith, (iii) 
without notice that the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored or 
that there is an uncured default with respect to payment of another 
instrument issued as part of the same series, (iv) without notice that the 
instrument contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered, (v) 
without notice of any claim to the instrument described in § 3-306, and 
(vi) without notice that any party has a defense or claim in recoupment 
described in § 3-305(a).
 which defines a 
holder in due course as the holder of an instrument if: 
(1) the instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder does not bear 
such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration or is not otherwise so 
irregular or incomplete as to call into question its authenticity; and 
162
This allows a secondary-market purchaser to defeat all “personal” 
defenses to the loan agreement, including unconscionability, if it meets the 
requirements of a holder in due course.
 
163
Finally, unconscionability claims and defenses are extremely expensive 
to litigate, dampening incentives to bring those claims, and a lender may be 
able to defeat the claim by adducing proof that the high price of the loan is 
justified by risk-based pricing, where prices rise in response to the added 
risk presented by the borrower.
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 159. Id. Unconscionability has been defined to include “an absence of meaningful choice on the 
part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the 
other party.”  Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). For 
a number of reasons, many courts have been reluctant to condemn excessive prices as 
unconscionable, without more. See id. 
 160. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1300. 
 161. This doctrine is contained in U.C.C. § 3-302 (2005). 
 162. Id. 
 163. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1300. 
 164. See Creola Johnson, Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation: First We Need a Bed and a 
Car, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 1221, 1256 (2000) (“[D]isgruntled consumers are not likely to succeed in 
ligation on grounds of unconscionability”); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd – 
Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 354–57 (1970). 
 As a result, these limitations make it 
exceedingly difficult for borrowers to challenge predatory-loan agreements 
as void under traditional contract law or the UCC. 
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B. ANTIQUATED AND INEFFECTIVE 
Antifraud laws are designed to redress information asymmetries in the 
formation of contracts.165 However, their extensive proof requirements and 
limited scope make them antiquated and ineffective. “Common-law fraud 
requires proof of affirmative misrepresentation and does not encompass 
misleading omissions or manipulation,” in addition to requiring “proof of 
detrimental reliance by the borrower,”166 which victims of predatory 
lending must show for the protection of these laws. Thus the “limited scope 
of common-law fraud, coupled with pragmatic concerns, has constrained 
the number of criminal fraud prosecutions against predatory lenders and 
brokers.”167 Moreover, “[e]ffective criminal fraud prosecution depends on 
the willingness of district attorneys to prosecute predatory-lending fraud,” 
and “limited local expertise, constrained resources, and other pressing 
prosecutorial demands—such as violent crime and drug trafficking—
combine to militate against prosecuting predatory lenders.”168
Although private causes of action for common-law fraud are an 
alternative route for victims of predatory lending, “fraud” is narrowly 
defined in common law, making it difficult to pursue such an action.
 
169 
Moreover, common-law fraud actions may not afford victims full relief in 
the form of loan forgiveness.170 This, coupled with the high cost of 
attorneys’ fees, makes incentives to file suits for equitable relief (such as 
rescission or loan forgiveness) inadequate for private action, as these cases 
generally do not generate sufficient funds to compensate plaintiffs’ 
counsel.171 Furthermore, the need to prove individual reliance in fraud cases 
often makes it difficult to bring class actions, so potential plaintiffs have 
difficulty working together to protect their rights.172 In addition, 
“mandatory-arbitration clauses in many predatory loan-agreements preclude 
resort to court altogether.”173
As a response to the limitations of common-law fraud, the unfair and 
deceptive acts and practices legislation (UDAP) has been passed in all fifty 
 These problems have not been solved despite 
federal and state attempts at protective legislation. 
                                                                                                                 
 165. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1301. 
 166. Id. See also, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525, 537–45 (1977). 
 167. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1302. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. These difficulties are both practical and legal. From a practical standpoint, in a very large 
class with plaintiffs from all over the country, it is difficult to show individual detrimental reliance 
for each borrower, as one would have to go above and beyond the normal requirements in 
certifying a class for such an action and actually handle each class member’s case on an almost 
individual basis to show such reliance. From a legal standpoint, this could cause a case to last such 
a long time as to threaten the judicial economy that class actions are meant to serve. See id. 
 173. Id. at 1302–03. 
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states, the District of Columbia, and in Congress.174 Although the federal 
statute, which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
trade or commerce,175 grants enforcement to the Federal Trade 
Commission176 (FTC), it does not provide a private right of action (either 
express or implied).177 Moreover, while state UDAP statutes usually allow 
for private damage actions as well as state enforcement, they are sometimes 
restricted in their scope.178
C. STATUTORY FAILURE 
 
While several federal statutes mandate the disclosure of standardized 
price information on loans in consumer lending,179 these statutes all have 
major weaknesses. Although more recently states have responded to the 
problem of evading HOEPA by adopting measures that lower the coverage 
triggers for lenders in those states,180
                                                                                                                 
 174. See generally National Consumer Law Center, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices 
1.1. (4th ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000) [hereinafter UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES]. 
 175. See Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(2) (2000). 
 176. While the FTC has filed a number of recent enforcement actions challenging actions by 
predatory lenders as unfair and deceptive under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
with some resulting in monetary relief to borrowers, the absence of a private cause of action, 
shifting political winds, and constraints on the FTC’s enforcement resources “make private relief 
under the Federal Trade Commission Act highly unlikely for the vast majority of victimized 
borrowers.” A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1304. 
 177. See UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES, supra note 174, at 9.1; A Tale of 
Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1304. 
 178. For example, some state statutes exclude credit and insurance transactions, often because 
financial institutions are exempted or because credit and insurance are deemed not to be “goods 
and services.” This essentially would exempt the lenders and SPVs who are involved in these 
transactions from liability under such a statute. Moreover, weak attorneys’ fees provisions in some 
state UDAP statutes discourage the private bar from bringing state UDAP claims, leaving 
plaintiffs with little recourse, even in instances of fraud. See A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 
18, at 1304; UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES, supra note 174, at 8.1. 
 179. For example, TILA requires lenders to disclose finance charges and annual percentage 
rates to applicants for home mortgages, and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) 
entitles home-mortgage borrowers to good-faith estimates of settlement costs (GFEs) and 
statements of their actual closing costs in HUD-1 settlement statements. See A Tale of Three 
Markets, supra note 18, at 1304; 15 U.S.C. 1601-1693(c) (2000) (TILA); see also 12 U.S.C. 2601-
2617 (2000) (RESPA). 
 180. Enacted in 1999, North Carolina’s predatory-lending statute was the first. It retained the 
federal trigger for APRs of ten percent, but lowered the trigger for total points and fees to five 
percent for total loan amounts greater than or equal to $ 20,000, or the lesser of $ 1000 or eight 
percent of principal for smaller loans. The statute is also broader than HOEPA in that it covers 
home mortgages with prepayment penalties that either exceed two percent of the amount prepaid 
or are payable more than thirty months after closing. In 2000, the New York Banking Board 
amended part 41 of its regulations to lower the APR trigger from ten to eight percent and the 
trigger for total points and fees from eight to five percent. See A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 
18, at 1304; N.C. Gen. Stat. 24-1.1E(a)(4), (a)(6) (1999); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. Tit. 3, 
41.1(d)-(3) (2000). 
 this increased disclosure is not enough 
because lenders will always find ways to evade disclosure requirements. 
Furthermore, the majority of victims of predatory lending already find 
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current disclosures incomprehensible, and piling on more disclosures will 
not help.181
Federal statutes have not succeeded in filling in the gaps left by state 
law. For high-cost, closed-end mortgages (other than purchase money-
mortgages), HOEPA requires additional disclosures three days before 
closing.
 
182 Although violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the 
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), and HOEPA are subject 
to agency enforcement, violators of TILA and HOEPA are also subject to 
criminal penalties.183 “In addition, TILA,184 RESPA,185 and HOEPA186 
authorize private rights of action, but differ significantly in the types of 
relief they afford borrowers.”187 These statutes do not succeed in the 
activities they seek to prohibit and the relief they provide.188
                                                                                                                 
 181. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1309. 
 182. Under HOEPA’s advance disclosure provisions, the lender must inform the borrower of 
the annual percentage rate (“APR”), which is the effective interest rate the borrower will pay on a 
loan, the dollar amount of the periodic payments, the size of any balloon payments, the amount 
borrowed, and any charges for optional credit insurance or debt-cancellation coverage. HOEPA 
lenders must also advise borrowers in writing that they may lose their homes and are not obligated 
to proceed to closing simply because they signed a loan application or received disclosures. 
Lastly, for adjustable-rate mortgages that fall within HOEPA, lenders must disclose that the 
interest rate and monthly payment could increase, plus the amount of the single maximum 
monthly payment. See A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1305; 15 U.S.C. 1601, 1602(aa), 
1639(a)-(b) (2000) (TILA). 
 183. “Lenders who willfully and knowingly violate any requirement of TILA or HOEPA, for 
example, face a maximum fine of $ 5000 and imprisonment for up to one year.”  A Tale of Three 
Markets, supra note 18, at 1305 n.212; see also 15 U.S.C. 1611 (2000) (TILA). 
 184. “Under TILA, injured borrowers may seek actual damages, statutory damages, and 
attorneys’ fees, either individually or in class actions, and may stave off foreclosure for up to three 
years after closing under TILA’s provisions, where specified disclosures were not correctly made 
at closing.”  A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1306; see generally NATIONAL 
CONSUMER LAW CENTER, TRUTH IN LENDING ch. 8 (4th ed. 1999) [hereinafter TRUTH IN 
LENDING]. 
 185. “Under RESPA, private damages for erroneous disclosures generally cannot be awarded 
unless borrowers can prove that lenders: (1) failed to inform them that their loans could be 
transferred, (2) received kickbacks, or (3) steered them to title companies. Specifically lenders 
have no liability under RESPA for errors in GFEs or HUD-1 settlement statements, thereby 
weakening their incentives for accuracy.” See A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1306; 12 
U.S.C. 2605(f)-2608 (2000) (RESPA). 
 186. “HOEPA’s private remedies include all of the remedies that are available under TILA, plus 
special enhanced damages consisting of all finance charges and fees paid by the borrower and 
expanded rights of rescission.”  A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1306; see also 15 
U.S.C. 1640(a)(4) (2000) (TILA); see generally TRUTH IN LENDING, supra note 184, at 10.3.3, 
10.6. 
 187. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1306–07. 
 188. HUD and the Federal Reserve Board raised concerns about the efficacy of these statutes in 
a joint report to Congress. See DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & FED. RES. BOARD, JOINT 
REPORT TO CONGRESS, TRUTH IN LENDING ACT AND THE REAL ESTATE PROCEDURES ACT, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY II (1998), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/ 
rptcongress/tila.pdf. 
 For example, 
TILA “has not lived up to its goal of standardizing disclosures on the total 
cost of credit because a long list of closing costs are currently excluded 
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when computing financial charges and annual percentage rates.”189  In 
addition, although HOEPA has made improvements, it is easy to evade 
because of its narrow coverage, and it does not apply to purchase-money 
mortgages, reverse mortgages, or open-end credit lines of any kind.190 More 
importantly, HOEPA only applies if (1) the annual percentage rate at 
consummation exceeds the yield on Treasury securities of comparable 
maturity plus eight percent for first-lien loans (or ten percent for 
subordinate-lien loans); or (2) the total points and fees exceed eight percent 
of the total loan amount or $400 (subject to annual indexing), whichever is 
greater.191 As a result, to evade HOEPA, a lender can either style a loan as 
an open-end extension of credit, or keep the interest or total points and fees 
below the respective ten-and eight-percent triggers, which are so high that 
most lenders, including predatory lenders, are able to price their loans 
below them.192
V. IT’S NOT THEIR FAULT: WHY ASSIGNEES SHOULD NOT BE 
HELD LIABLE 
 
In their March 2007 article, Engel and McCoy argue that, given 
“securitization’s role in enabling and perpetuating predatory lending . . . the 
law should impose full, quantifiable assignee liability on securitized trusts 
that do not adopt adequate controls to filter out predatory loans from loan 
pools.”193 In addition, they argue that assignee liability should apply to 
suitability violations and certain other legal violations by mortgage brokers 
and lenders.194 Their proposal seeks to hold the secondary market 
responsible for policing lenders.195 A system of assignee liability is used 
whereby entities that engage in due diligence designed to detect loans with 
abusive terms have their liability capped.196 Further, they propose extending 
assignee liability only to specific causes of action, including: (1) common 
law tort claims, such as fraud and improvident lending; (2) contract claims 
such as unconscionability; and (3) claims under state and local anti-
predatory lending laws.197 Additionally, they would impose liability on 
assignees for violations of a national suitability standard that they 
previously proposed in an earlier article.198
                                                                                                                 
 189. A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1306–07. 
 190. Id. at 1307. See also 15 U.S.C. 1602(i), (w), (bb) (2000) (TILA). 
 191. See 15 U.S.C. 1602(aa)(1)-(4) (2000) (TILA); TRUTH IN LENDING, supra note 184, 3.9. 
 192. See A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1307–08; see also HUD-TREASURY 
REPORT, supra note 17, at 85; TRUTH IN LENDING, supra note 184, at 10.1.1. 
 193. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2042. 
 194. Id. at 2081. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 2089. 
 198. See A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18, at 1366. 
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Although their proposal would provide new forms of redress for 
borrowers who have been victims of predatory lending, it seeks to do so by 
holding liable those who have purchased these securitized predatory loans 
on the secondary market.199 This seems counterintuitive, in that borrowers 
have had no contact whatsoever with these purchasers, nor were the 
purchasers involved at any stage of the lending process.200 While Engel and 
McCoy insist that this proposal would not espouse radical changes to the 
secondary market by comparing the due diligence proposed to that currently 
adopted by GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,201 those organizations are 
substantially larger than many of the private actors involved in this market, 
so the proposal could drive out many of these actors from the market. 
Through increased costs of due diligence, there is a danger of driving out 
legitimate credit if such a proposal were imposed. As stated earlier, 
legitimate subprime lending is necessary to provide a source of credit to 
borrowers that otherwise may have no such access to credit.202 By imposing 
such heightened due diligence requirements on secondary market actors, 
actors that had nothing to do with the original loan process would subject 
themselves to substantial potential liability to borrowers, in addition to the 
high costs of such heightened due diligence. Engel and McCoy state that 
there is evidence that state anti-predatory lending laws have not had an 
adverse impact on the flow of subprime credit.203  However, as they 
themselves made clear in this and an earlier article,204 the current state anti-
predatory lending laws are quite ineffective, and as such, one would not 
“expect them to have had too strong of an impact on ‘the flow of subprime 
credit.’”205
As a result, although Engel and McCoy are truly experts in this field, 
their most recent proposal seems, at this point, to go too far in looking to 
impose assignee liability on secondary market actors. However, it remains 
to be seen whether, if there is a regulator either created or assigned to this 
industry, their proposal could be in turn adopted.
 
206
                                                                                                                 
 199. See generally Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21. 
 200. Purchasers on the secondary market buy securities that include loans made by banks and 
SPVs to borrowers that already contain the predatory loans. This is because the “lenders [don’t] 
care,” because they have sold the mortgages and “their hands [are] clean.” See David Hendricks, 
Financing of Homes Must Change, MY SA BUSINESS, Sept. 9, 2008, 
http://www.mysanantonio.com/business/columnists/david_hendricks/Financing_of_homes_must_
change.html. 
 201. See Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2095. 
 202. See supra Part I. 
 203. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2098. 
 204. See generally, A Tale of Three Markets, supra note 18. 
 205. Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21, at 2096–7. 
 206. A regulator was proposed in Engel & McCoy’s earlier article A Tale of Three Markets, 
supra note 18. 
  If there were such a 
regulator for the industry, then at least some of the costs associated with 
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their proposal would be reduced, and there would be much lower risk of 
losing critical actors in what was at one time a profitable and vital industry. 
VI. HELP IS AROUND THE CORNER 
Current regulation and remedies in the subprime industry do not 
address the grave problems in the subprime lending industry. Remedies and 
regulations, some of which allow actors like extant SPVs to avoid any 
liability despite being involved in the securitization of loan pools that 
include predatory loans, are one major problem.207 Coupled with the lack of 
a true regulator for the subprime lending industry, these matters have 
allowed the entities involved in this industry to continue to avoid liability 
despite dealing in illegal predatory loans. Although there are agencies that 
regulate certain entities involved in securitization,208
A. THE NEED FOR A REGULATOR 
 these agencies do not 
regulate the subprime lending industry as a whole. Legislation should thus 
be passed to either create a new regulatory organization to oversee the 
lending industry and resulting securitization, or designate the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as the industry’s regulator. By 
having a regulator specifically for the lending and securitization industry, 
consumer-protection mechanisms or remedies that do have potential to be 
effective may be more properly applied, in addition to creating true 
accountability for those who continue to violate proper lending practices. 
This, in turn, would allow for SPVs to be held accountable for engaging in 
securitization of loan pools that contain predatory loans, without leaving it 
in the hands of secondary market actors, or lenders themselves to comply 
with proper lending practices. Therefore, legislation must be passed to 
cover this industry and force industry actors to comply with appropriate 
lending practice standards. 
First, all entities that desire to be involved in the lending industry and 
resulting securitization should be required to register with this new 
regulator, similar to member firms who register with the Financial 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in order to participate in trading 
securities.209
                                                                                                                 
 207. See generally Turning a Blind Eye, supra note 21. 
 208. For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency “charters, regulates, and 
supervises all national banks.” As a result, although they have worked towards identifying 
predatory practices within their regulation of national banks, most mortgage creating institutions 
are outside this scope, and other agencies have to fill this regulatory gap in order to be successful 
in stopping predatory lending practices. See Comptroller of the Currency Administrator of 
National Banks, About the OCC, http://www.occtreas.gov/aboutocc.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 
2007). 
 209. “FINRA is the largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the 
United States.”  See FINRA homepage, http://www.finra.org/index.htm. 
 In conjunction with this requirement, these actors should be 
required to adopt the “best practice standards” that were created by the 
2008] The Battle Against Predatory Subprime Lending 239 
GSEs involved in this industry, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This would 
require, for example, that lenders eliminate certain prepayment terms and 
balloon clauses that make their loans predatory. As stated above, those 
currently outside of the “conforming market” are free to adopt internal 
standards of their own, which has resulted in very few actors adopting the 
“best practices.”210
To ensure compliance with the “best practice” standards, the SPVs’ 
securitized products should be subject to a thorough investigation prior to 
being sold on the secondary market to investors (assignees). A regulator 
could apply the fraud provisions
 By requiring all entities in this industry to adopt the best 
practices in order to qualify to participate in this market, there would finally 
be a new sheriff in town. 
211 from the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 to these securities if they have not complied with the required 
standards, thus subjecting them to criminal liability, in addition to a private 
right of action that courts have implied in cases under this statute.212 The 
best practice standards would require heightened disclosure by the SPVs of 
the quality of loans being securitized, as well as an explanation by lenders 
to borrowers of the clear meanings of the various loan terms. By subjecting 
the entities involved in subprime lending to such standards, in addition to 
regulation by an industry regulator, those that did not comply with the 
disclosure requirements would violate the fraud provisions for making a 
material misstatement. This would incentivize SPVs to fulfill their due 
diligence and disclosure requirements more properly and not just engage in 
aggregation of acceptable loans and predatory loans in order to assemble 
more diversified loan pools, without increasing significantly the costs of 
secondary market actors to participate in this industry.213
B. EVENING THE PLAYING FIELD 
 
Moreover, SPVs should be exempted from the protection of the 
“holder-in-due-course” rule that reduces SPV’s legal risk. The new 
regulator of this industry should apply a rebuttable presumption of bad faith 
when an SPV attempts to sell securitized loan pools that contain predatory 
loans to investors. This would be fair, as the SPVs would be aware that they 
were subject to heightened due diligence requirements in selling these 
loans, and as a result should have screened out such predatory loans prior to 
securitizing and attempting to sell the product to investors. Thus, the SPV 
                                                                                                                 
 210. See supra Part III, C. 
 211. See Securites and Exchange Act of 1934, § 2B, 15 U.S.C. §78(j)(b) (2000); see also 17 
C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (2007). 
 212. Id. 
 213. This is because if the regulator would be responsible for investigating loan pools to make 
sure they comply with the requisite standards as opposed to the secondary market actor being 
solely responsible for ensuring compliance, the overall costs can be reduced for the secondary 
market actors, shared with the regulator. Further, if the regulator is funded by the government, 
then costs will be spread throughout the nation from United States tax dollars. 
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would not qualify as a “holder-in-due-course,” because to do so, holders of 
an instrument must be doing so in good faith.214
C. WE NEED DILIGENCE 
 It could be argued that this 
would disincentivize SPVs from participating in the lending industry 
because of the potential liability and increased costs. However, because of 
the potential for lucrative profits, and the marginal costs in requiring SPVs 
to conduct proper due diligence and comply with best practice standards 
(when they would be doing so in conjunction with a regulator also using its 
resources to screen loan pools), this would help curb the predatory lending 
problem, without removing these entities from this profitable market. 
In conjunction with removing SPVs from the “holder-in-due-course” 
exemption, there should be changes made in the due diligence requirements 
that currently exist in this industry. SPVs must be incentivized to insist on 
proper due diligence compliance by lenders, such as subjecting them to 
liability along with lenders215
As stated above, the current federal and state law regimes have 
numerous holes that allow predatory lenders to escape their reach.
 (for example a substantial fine, and after 
multiple violations a bar from participating in the lending and securitization 
markets). Moreover, in cases of Rule 144A offerings, substantive due 
diligence on the part of the institutional investor (the SPV) should be 
required apart from any conducted by the lenders, underwriters, or rating 
agencies. As stated above, predatory loans may avoid SEC regulation if 
they qualify for the Rule 144A exemption, which can be easily achieved. It 
is necessary to remove Rule 144A offerings from this exemption, and 
subject them to SEC regulation or at least to that of a new industry 
regulator. 
Another change that should be made is to require lenders to retain their 
interest in the subordinated tranches that they helped create in securitizing 
the loan pools. By forcing these lenders to retain their residuals, they would 
be incentivized to make sure that they were safe loans in the first place. The 
central purpose of residuals is to force lenders to retain the bulk of the credit 
risk they create and by forcing them to retain the residuals, they would not 
be able to avoid the credit risk of improper loans and the potential defaults 
on re-payment of such loans. As a result, this would allow the market 
discipline that residuals were meant to exert on lenders to actually be 
effective. 
216
                                                                                                                 
 214. U.C.C. § 3-302 (2005). 
 215. As stated above, this would at least in part be due to SPVs exemption from the protections 
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Although some states have begun to resolve this problem by lowering 
coverage triggers within their state, states are not equipped with the 
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financial experience and regulatory capacity necessary to combat the 
creativity of predatory lenders.217
Moreover, even where due diligence is required, there is an inherent 
conflict of interest when the underwriters who appraise the scrutinized loans 
work for the lenders. “Securitization may be the only business in the world 
where the appraiser is hired by, paid by, and thus works for, the seller rather 
than the buyer.”
 Thus, the SEC, or a regulator that would 
be specifically created for this industry, would apply its expertise in this 
area to determine whether an appropriate coverage trigger for applying 
HOEPA would be nationwide. 
218 For example, “it would be unthinkable in a real estate 
transaction for the seller of a property to expect that the buyer would accept 
a seller-provided appraisal as the basis of the buyer’s valuation, and yet this 
is exactly what transpires in the bond market.”219
D. GIVING BORROWERS A CHANCE 
 Thus, this conflict of 
interest must be removed and realigned. This could be accomplished by 
either requiring the rating agencies to work for the bond buyers, or at the 
very least by requiring full disclosure to the borrowers that the agencies 
work for or with the lenders. If these agencies do not comply with such 
disclosure requirements, they should be subject to criminal liability brought 
by the regulator of the industry, as well as a private cause of action brought 
by a victimized borrower. 
Another necessary change in the current remedial structure is an 
adjustment of the requirements for common law fraud actions pursued by 
borrowers against lenders who have purveyed predatory loans. As stated 
previously, the current state of the law makes it very difficult for borrowers 
to successfully bring individual anti-fraud actions, as they are costly and 
have difficult proof requirements for plaintiffs. The “American Rule,”220 in 
which each party bears it own attorneys’ fees and costs, provides incentives 
to file suits for injunctive relief, such as rescission or loan forgiveness 
inadequate for the private bar. This, coupled with the need to prove 
individual reliance in fraud cases, often makes it difficult to bring class 
actions.221
One solution would be to adjust the traditional “American Rule” in the 
context of cases involving fraudulent predatory loans to borrowers. If 
legislation is passed to allow recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs by the 
prevailing party for specifically these circumstances, borrowers with 
legitimate suits could afford to bring claims against a fraudulent lender who 
 However, there are solutions to these complex problems. 
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has purveyed a predatory loan. This would not threaten the judicial 
economy, as borrowers with frivolous suits would be deterred from 
bringing such a suit for fear of having to pay the other side’s attorney’s fees 
and costs, while incentivizing those with legitimate suits to come forward 
and help combat the predatory lenders that exist throughout the nation. 
Another solution to these complex problems of bringing a loan fraud 
action for borrowers is to change the proof requirements when bringing a 
class action. Instead of requiring proof of individual reliance in fraud cases, 
which is quite impractical, this area of the law could adopt the fraud-on-the-
market theory, which is applied in the case of materially misleading 
statements made by directors on a corporation’s behalf to the detriment of 
shareholders.222 This theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and 
developed securities market, the price of a company’s stock is determined 
by the available material information regarding the company and its 
business.223 Thus, misleading statements will defraud purchasers of stock 
even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements.224 As 
applied to the lending industry, this would allow for class action borrowers 
to avoid having to show direct reliance on a fraudulent misstatement 
regarding the loan terms. Instead, a rebuttable presumption of reliance 
would be applied. It would then be the lenders’ burden to rebut such a 
presumption. The policy behind this theory is that requiring proof of 
individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class 
effectively would prevent these plaintiffs (borrowers) from proceeding with 
a class action, since individual issues then would overwhelm the common 
ones.225 While this is a different situation than the case in which the 
doctrine developed, the central principle remains the same: investors or 
borrowers rely on the integrity of the price set by the market, and forcing 
plaintiffs in these cases to show a speculative state of facts (for example, 
how he or she would have acted if omitted material information had been 
disclosed, or if the misrepresentation had not been made), would place an 
unrealistic evidentiary burden on the plaintiffs. The presumption of reliance 
employed in these instances is consistent with congressional policy 
embodied in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.226
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Consequently, it is apparent that in the current state of affairs, the 
subprime lending industry will not fix itself through self-regulation or 
existing remedies. There are significant gaps existing in the current law, and 
the remedies that are available for borrowers are inadequate. Further, the 
entities involved in predatory subprime lending and securitization of loan 
pools that include predatory loans have no incentives to divert from their 
current behaviors, as they have not been faced with liability for 
noncompliance with the standards and practices of proper subprime 
lending. Thus, it is clear that these entities need to be regulated, and through 
SRO regulation, current standards and mechanisms that exist to prevent 
predatory subprime lending must be adjusted to properly combat this 
harmful practice. In addition to this regulation, if at least some of the 
aforementioned changes are made to the current remedial system in place, 
borrowers and investors will receive meaningful recourse, without 
subjecting profit-seeking actors in the subprime lending and securitization 
industry to prohibitive costs.  Furthermore, going forward, noncompliance 
with new regulations and rules would subject the entities in this industry to 
fines, a bar from the industry, and criminal or substantial civil liability. 
Inscribed on the pediment of Winston Churchill’s statute at the site of the 
Winston Churchill Memorial and Library is the epigraph from Churchill’s 
History of the Second World War: “In war, resolution. In defeat, defiance. 
In victory, magnanimity. In peace, good will.”227
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